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MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK v. COMMISSIONER
AND ITS UNCHARITABLE AFTERMATH
BY IRWIN ALBERT*
The desire to reduce estate tax liability is always a proper objective
of the estate planner. A favored means of attaining this goal, seemingly
encouraged by congressional policy, is the charitable devise or bequest. In
order to provide for more favored objects of their bounty, however, donors
frequently postpone the enjoyment of the charitable gift in favor of designated
income beneficiaries. With few exceptions,1 a remainder interest in a charity
subject to one or more income interests in life beneficiaries is readily ascertain-
able and therefore deductible from the gross estate.2 Problems arise when
the charitable remainder is either conditional or subject to diversion in favor
of noncharitable beneficiaries because of the decreased reliability of ascertain-
ment of the amount the charity will ultimately receive. In attempting to
accommodate the need for revenue3 and the encouragement of charitable
giving, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have created a regulatory
and decisional maze which has continued to entrap the hapless estate planner.
This Article will concern itself with the development of regulatory and
decisional tests to determine the deductibility of conditional gifts to charities
and gifts to charities subject to diversion, an analysis of inherent concepts
underlying these tests, and appropriate recommendations.
It should be stressed initially that the problems to be discussed are
primarily concerned with valuation, because of the general principle that
estate tax deductions of charitable remainders are permissible only insofar
* Lecturer on Taxation, Dickinson School of Law; B.S. in Econ., 1950, University
of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1958, University of Pennsylvania; member, Pennsylvania and
District of Columbia Bars.
1. E.g., a situation where the charitable remainder interest cannot be severed from
the noncharitable interest because the dispositive instrument provides for investment of
corpus in regulated investment companies and for dividends representing capital gains
to be treated as income, or if, under local law, such dividends would be so treated. See
Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 77.
2. INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) provides, in part:
"Remainders and similar interests. If a trust is created or property is transferred for
both a charitable and a private purpose, deduction may be taken of the value of the
charitable beneficial interest only insofar as that interest is presently ascertainable, and
hence severable from the noncharitable interest." See Rudick & Gray, Bounty Twice
Blessed: Tax Consequences of Gifts of Property to or in Trust for Charity, 16 TAx
L. REv. 273, 298 (1961).
3. It is generally understood that the prime object of the estate tax is not the
production of revenue, but rather the diminution of swollen fortunes. See BITTKER,
FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 807-11 (2d ed. 1961). The term, "need
for revenue," as used herein, is intended to encompass any and all motives which underlie
the imposition of the estate tax.
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as value can be ascertained.4 In Humes v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court examined a claimed deduction for a gift to a charity conditioned upon
the decedent's niece dying without issue before attaining the age of forty.
Although the estate tax regulations at the time prohibited a deduction in
respect of conditional bequests to charity if the condition had not been met
at the time of the decedent's death, 6 the taxpayer urged a valuation, ex-
pressed as a percentage of present value, based upon principles of probability
and the use of certain allegedly relevant experience tables. The Court dis-
allowed the deduction; however, the disallowance apparently resulted from
the Court's skepticism regarding the reliability of the proferred experience
tables, rather than from adherence to the regulations and blanket rejection of
the use of actuarial principles.
7
Shortly after the Humes decision, the question of deductibility of a
charitable remainder subject to diversion in favor of noncharitable benefi-
ciaries was presented to the Court in the case of Ithaca Trust Co. v. United
States.s The deferred principal sum which constituted the charitable bequest
was subject to invasion to the extent "necessary to suitably maintain [the
decedent's wife] .. . in as much comfort as she now enjoys."9 However,
in view of the wife's probable future support and maintenance requirements,
which almost certainly would not have necessitated invasion of corpus,
the Court allowed the deduction in full. This decision turned on the factual
determination that no meaningful uncertainty existed as to the charity's
ability to realize the principal intact upon the death of the wife.' 0 The like-
lihood of diversion was so remote as to be negligible.
The Humes and Ithaca Trust cases provided the background for the
4. See note 2 supra.
5. 276 U.S. 487 (1928).
6. Id. at 491.
7. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the majority, stated as follows:
The volume and character of the experience upon which the conclusions drawn
from these two tables are based, differ from the volume and character of the
experience embodied in standard mortality tables, almost as widely as possibility
from certainty. Both of these tables are based on data contained in volumes of
Lodge's Peerage .... Did Congress, in providing for the determination of the
net estate taxable, intend that a deduction should be made for a contingency
the actual value of which cannot be determined from any known data? Neither
taxpayer, nor revenue officer,-even if equipped with all the aid which the actu-
arial art can supply,--could do more than guess at the value of this contingency.
Id. at 493-94.
8. 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
9. Id. at 154.
10. The term "meaningful uncertainty" is intended to be equivalent to the phrase,
"uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs,"
used by Mr. Justice Holmes, ibid. In the year preceding the Ithaca Trust decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had been presented with a similar fact situation
involving a power to invade corpus "for the proper support and comfort" of the dece-
dent's wife, who had an independent estate worth $300,000. This fact, coupled with the
fact that, in the 12 months following the testator's death, the trust corpus had produced
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case of Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner," decided by the Supreme
Court in 1943. Like Ithaca Trust, the Merchants Nat'l Bank case was con-
cerned with a question of possible diversion of corpus to the decedent's wife,
but the criteria for invasion were "the comfort, support, maintenance, and/or
happiness"'12 of the spouse, who was sixty-seven years of age at the time.
In disallowing the deduction, the majority indicated its concern over the
"happiness" factor, and concluded that "the salient fact is that the purposes
for which the widow could, and might wish to have the funds spent do
not lend themselves to reliable prediction."' 3 As this language seems to
suggest, the majority was apparently concerned only with the difficulty of
ascertaining the value of the charity's interest, because of the generous
standard for invasion of principal. The remoteness test of Ithaca Trust, al-
though not rejected, was simply never reached, notwithstanding the sug-
gestion in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas that the practical
possibility of diversion was equally as remote as in Ithaca Trust, in view of
the conservatism of the corporate trustee and the "habits and temperament of
this sixty-seven-year-old lady." 14 Accordingly, the Treasury Department,
quick to seize upon the opportunity to limit the application of the charitable
deduction, adopted regulations conforming to the Merchants Nat'l Bank
decision and requiring susceptibility to present ascertainment as the criterion
for deductibility in all cases of charitable remainders subject to diversion,
irrespective of the actual likelihood or remoteness of noncharitable diversion.15
The remoteness test, however, was not to be forgotten. Notwithstanding
the apparent willingness of the Supreme Court, as evidenced in Humes, to
accept a sound actuarial ascertainment of present value in the area of
conditional bequests,' 6 regulations were adopted disallowing deduction of
any conditional gift to a charity "unless the possibility that charity will not
take is so remote as to be negligible." 17 These regulations were sanctified
income in excess of $60,000, led the court to conclude that the possibility of invasion
was sufficiently remote to permit the full deduction, thereby anticipating the Ithaca Trust
decision. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Snead, 24 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1928).
11. 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
12. Id. at 258. (Emphasis added.)
13. Id. at 262.
14. Id. at 264. Commenting on the Merchants Nat'l Bank case, Chief Judge
Magruder has pointed out that "the Court [disregarded] ...as irrelevant the conclu-
sion of the Board of Tax Appeals that there was reason to believe that the life tenant
would never want more than the income from the trust and that 'the possibility of corpus
being invaded is sufficiently remote to justify the deductions claimed.'" Blodget v.
Delaney, 201 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187, 193 (1955). The current
provision in the estate tax regulations denies the deduction "unless the possibility that
the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible." Treas.
Reg. § 20. 2055-2(b).
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in Commissioner v. Sternberger's Estate,i8 which involved a charitable
remainder conditioned to take effect only upon the testator's daughter's
death without issue surviving her and her mother. There was little question
regarding the reliability of actuarial ascertainment of the charity's interest,
and the Tax Court had accepted actuarial valuation of the probability of
the daughter's remarriage and having children. 19 Nor did the Supreme Court
deny that the value of the remainder was presently ascertainable; rather,
it construed the regulations as permitting actuarial computations only in cases
of so-called deferred but assured bequests, as distinguished from conditional
gifts.
20
The current regulations, which accord with Merchants Nat'l Bank and
Sternberger, have altogether emasculated the original, distinct formulations
of Humes and Ithaca. Trust. All conditional charitable bequests must now be
subjected to the remoteness test, irrespective of susceptibility to actuarial
calculation, 21 and all charitable bequests subject to diversion must be articulated
in such a manner as to permit rather precise determination of that portion
of the property exempt from the exercise of the power, even though the
likelihood of any invasion be remote.2 If it be assumed that these decisional
and regulatory tests should tend to further the congressional policy not to
benefit the national revenue at the expense of charitable institutions, an
analysis would seem to be in order.
The mere disallowance, per se, of a large number of conditional bequests
to charities is not cause for reaching the conclusion that congressional policy
is not being furthered, since deductions are always a matter of privilege
rather than right.23 To establish the desirability of one formulation as opposed
18. 348 U.S. 187 (1955).
19. Estate of Sternberger v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), aff'd per curiam,
207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court's rejection of actuarial valuation in
Sternberger was based in part on the ability of the decedent's daughter voluntarily to
remarry and to have children, thereby defeating the contingent charitable remainder.
However, Sternberger has been construed as requiring a remoteness 'test in all cases
involving contingent gifts, whether or not the usual probabilities could be varied by the
voluntary act of a person. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, infra note 25, at 29.
20. 348 U.S. at 199. An example of a deferred but assured bequest would be a
life estate to A, remainder to a charity. In Moffett's Estate v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d
738 (4th Cir. 1959), the court used the remoteness test to disallow deduction of a
remainder subject to a life annuity to be paid out of principal. Even though the court
conceded that, according to standard mortality tables, the chances of the annuity ex-
hausting corpus were only 191 in 1,000, and that the present value of the remainder
was ascertainable on the basis of the annuitant's life expectancy, it considered the gift
contingent and therefore subject to the remoteness test. Query, whether the distinction
between this situation and the typical assured but deferred bequest is one of substance.
21. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b).
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a).
23. As in income taxation, the burden is on the taxpayer to justify the claimed
deduction.
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to another, concrete justification, other than mere beneficence to charities,
must be offered. An examination of the usual valuation of the deferred but
assured bequest, or "vested" remainder, will demonstrate that the Internal
Revenue Service simply discounts the value of principal at an approved dis-
count rate over a term of years or a life expectancy. In the case of a vested
remainder subject to a life estate, present valuation necessitates the use of
mortality tables, and the effect is the same as if the provision had been for a
term of years equivalent to the life expectancy of the income beneficiary at the
time of the decedent's death.2 4 There is then present the assumption that
the charity will receive its gift in a certain number of years, whereas, in
actuality, receipt may occur sooner or later than anticipated. Furthermore,
in any given case, the corpus might not be received intact if waste occurred.
The use of the mortality tables in this situation, however, does appear to
accommodate the conflicting pulls of the need for revenue and the encourage-
ment of charitable giving; moreover, a rather perfect balance of these aims
should be achieved in an indefinite number of cases if the mortality, interest,
and intact value assumptions are sound. With these principles in mind, a
typical conditional gift to charity will next be examined.
In United States v. Dean,2 5 the charitable bequest was conditioned on
the failure of a person aged eighty-two to survive two persons aged sixty-
seven and sixty-eight. Although by actuarial computation the charity had
ten chances in eleven to take, the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the remoteness test and disallowed the deduction.2 6 It is submitted that there
is no appreciable difference between the situation presented in Dean and the
typical vested remainder following a life estate which should require a
difference in result. In the Dean case the very same assumption as to the
corpus being received intact by the remainderman, in spite of the possibility
of waste, is made. The present value of the corpus is also ascertained in the
same manner as in the deferred but assured bequest. Such value is then
reduced by the possibility of the charity not being the ultimate taker, and
quite often this possibility may not be overwhelming; however, in no event
will the determination be any less reliable than that made in the case of the
24. Compare the present value of a life estate in a person aged 78 under Table I
of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) and the present value of a 6 year term interest under
Table II of the same section. For an analysis of several problems occasionally involved
in the use of these tables, see Comment, Valuation for Purposes of the Federal Transfer
Taxes-When Should the Treasury Regulation's Actuarial Tables Be Used?, 29 U.
CHi. L. REv. 728 (1962).
25. 224 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1955).
26. Id. at 29. The court admitted difficulty in defining the necessary degree of
remoteness for purposes of deductibility, and finally suggested that, for an occurrence
to be "so remote as to be negligible," it should be "a chance which persons generally
would disregard as so highly improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety
in undertaking a serious business transaction." Ibid.
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vested remainder, since approved actuarial procedures are used.2 7 Although it
is true that the charity will either receive the entire corpus or nothing in
a given case, this percentage reduction, being an approved statistical reso-
lution, will result, in the aggregate of cases, in the charity recipients of con-
ditional bequests being as assured statistically of receiving the equivalent of
their bequest valuations as are charities receiving vested remainder interests.
This realization points up the unreality of the remoteness test in the area of
conditional gifts, for this test is defensible only as applied to one estate, and
it fails when applied to an indefinite number.
As pointed out in the discussion of the Ithaca Trust case, the original
formulation of the remoteness test was an articulation of a "de minimus"
rule. Where the estate could not demonstrate the present value of the chari-
table interest because of an invasion power, it was nevertheless permitted a
deduction if the possibility of invasion, in light of the expressed standard,
was so remote as to be negligible. The extremely slight possibility that in-
vasion would occur was ignored as de minimus in view of the need to effec-
tuate the congressional policy of encouraging charitable giving. This area
of charitable gifts subject to diversion lends itself readily to a remoteness
test because of the difficulty of evaluating the probable extent of diversion.
It is submitted that actuarial techniques are inappropriate in this situation
because, even though the likelihood of the incidence of invasion might be
reduced to a percentage by the use of approved techniques, the amount of
each invasion could never be ascertained. This is because the amount needed
for a person's support, maintenance or comfort is never fixed but varies with
ever-changing circumstances, such as health, employment and living standards.
Hence, in the absence of a remoteness test, no such gift could ever be the
subject of a deduction if a demonstration of the value of the interest exempt
from the power to divert were required. It is therefore recommended that
a deduction be allowed even though the present value of the charity's interest
in given property is not ascertainable, but that such allowance be limited
to situations where it can confidently be determined that the likelihood of the
charity not receiving the interest is so remote as to be negligible.
28  Al-
27. The actuarial tables and formulas to which reference is made are approved
by the Internal Revenue Service and are required to be used in valuing noncommercial
term, life and remainder interests, whether contingent or not, for federal estate tax
purposes.
28. In Blodget v. Delaney, supra note 14, Chief Judge Magruder suggested:
If there is a "clear Congressional policy not to benefit the national revenue at
the expense of charitable institutions," it seems that the decided cases have
drawn an unfortunate line in denying a charitable deduction wherever the power
to invade corpus is conferred in terms embracing "factors which cannot be
accounted for accurately by reliable statistical data and techniques" [citing
Merchants Nat'l Bank] . . . even though on the existing facts and circum-
stances one might conclude to a moral certainty that the power would never
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though this formulation may appear to eliminate the prerequisite of an
expressed, ascertainable standard for diversion, it will not do so if applied
properly. Where the power to invade is not subject to such a standard and
the charity has no enforceable right to preclude the exercise of the power, it
would seem inconceivable that the remoteness test could be met.
It is further recommended that, in the case of a conditional gift such
as that presented in the Dean case, the remoteness test be abandoned in favor
of the use of approved actuarial techniques which, as previously demonstrated,
will protect all interests over the long run of cases. 29 This approach would
sufficiently protect the national revenue and at the same time fully encourage
charitable giving. A possible use of the remoteness test in respect of condi-
tional gifts would be in reference to a subjective determination that waste or
similar conduct might result; however, the charity would have virtually the
same remedial rights in this situation as it would have in the case of a
deferred but assured bequest, and therefore no reason for different treatment
appears.
be exercised and that the unimpaired remainder would go to the charity upon
the death of the life tenant.
Id. at 594 (concurring opinion).
29. The computation of the present value of the charity's interest in United States
v. Dean, supra note 25, would be accomplished as follows:
Step 1. Find present value of corpus due at death of last to die of two persons
aged 68 and 67 by utilization of Table III of Actuarial Tables for Estate and Gift Tax
issued by the Internal Revenue Service, 2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAX. REP. ff 8003.55. Such
value equals .60564 of corpus.
Step 2. Consult Table II, as aforesaid, in order to convert present value of corpus
to the term for years that receipt thereof is deferred. .60564 = 14.582322 years (based
on straight-line interpolation).
Step 3. As 14.582322 years is the statistically approved number of years a person
aged 82 would have to live in order to survive two persons aged 68 and 67, the prob-
ability of such survival may be ascertained by utilizing Lx column of Table VI, as
aforesaid. Such probability (based on straight-line interpolation and rounding off) may
be expressed as
L 82 + 14.582322 3,225.66
-- = .01153.
L82 186,944
The value of the interest of the person aged 82 may be expressed as a percentage of
corpus by multiplying the present value of the deferred bequest by the probability factor
or (.60564) (.0172546) = .01045. Proof of such present value assuming a deferred
period of 14.582322 years may be demonstrated by utilizing Table V, as aforesaid, and
such proof may be expressed as follows:
Dx + 14.582322 D82 + 14.582322 116.8268
- = .01153.
Dx D82 11,132.8
(The variance of .00108 is attributable to rounding-off and the use of straight-line inter-
polation instead of ascertaining the degree of interpolation.) Accordingly, the present
value of the charity's interest in the Dean case under current tables would be
.60564-.01045 = .59519 of corpus.

